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Bold new ideas are rare in Australian strategic policy, but right now there is a big one brewing. The Government seems to think that Australia should build a much closer strategic relationship with Japan, and some even speak of a formal alliance in the 
not too distant future. Already interaction with Japan on strategic and defence issues 
has quietly but substantially expanded over the past few years. Expectations are almost 
certainly being raised about Australia’s willingness to go further, not just in Tokyo but in 
Washington and Beijing as well.  
And yet in Australia there has been no serious discussion, either in public or (one suspects) 
within Government, about whether a closer strategic relationship with Japan would serve 
our long-term interests. Maybe it is time to pause and reflect before things go much 
further. One sign of how far Australia’s strategic relations with Japan have already gone is 
the establishment of annual 2+2 meetings of Japanese and Australian Defence and Foreign 
Ministers.  Such meetings are rather unusual, and suggest that there is a substantial agenda 
of strategic business to be dealt with. But, the statement issued after this year’s meeting in 
September is even more telling.  Here are the key paragraphs: 
Australia and Japan are natural strategic partners sharing common values and 
interests, including a commitment to democracy, the rule of law, protection of 
human rights and open markets. 
 
Australia and Japan share a common strategic objective of ensuring long-term 
peace, stability and prosperity in the changing strategic and security environment in 
the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. 
 
To help achieve that objective, Australia and Japan are committed to working even 
more closely on security and defence matters in the following ways: 
 
Deepening exchanges and working together to strengthen regional cooperation on 
issues that have the potential to undermine the stability of the region.
 
Ensuring mutual support for our respective alliances with the United States, which 
continue to help underwrite peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific, and 
working together as active partners to maintain and strengthen comprehensive US 
engagement in the region.  
Such language can often be dismissed as mere verbiage, but there are two reasons to take 
this stuff more seriously.  The first is that it was made with Japan, which since the Pacific War 
has obsessively avoided any hint of a strategic relationship beyond its alliance with the US.  
This is probably the most forthright statement of common strategic purpose that Japan has 
made with any country except America since 1945. So for Japan it is a big deal.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• Australia and Japan seem to be moving towards an alliance.
• There is a strong convergence of values, economics and key allies.
• Yet the move, driven by the rise of China, carries significant risks.
• Australia needs to think carefully about the overlap of interests, not just values between 
Australia and Japan, before signing anything.
POLICY RECOMMENDATION  
Australia should push the pause button on the idea of a strategic alliance with Japan.  
For all the values and outlooks we share, Australia’s strategic interests are quite different from 
Japan’s, and the real risks to Australia far outweigh the potential benefits.
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The second is the wider regional strategic context, which gives the statement real 
significance.  At a time when US-China strategic rivalry is clearly escalating, this language 
unambiguously commits both countries to support ‘strengthened’ US engagement in Asia – 
in other words, the Pivot.  And at a time when Japan’s relations with both China and South 
Korea are strained by serious disputes, this language seems to put Australia on Japan’s side, 
against two countries which are very important to us.  So we have waded into pretty deep 
water here.
Moreover these words are being backed with more concrete ideas, the most significant 
of which involves submarines.  Japan has a formidable submarine capability, backed by 
an equally formidable technological and industrial base, and the Government is seriously 
thinking of seeking Japanese involvement in the project to replace the Collins class.  Some 
people even speak of buying some of Japan’s excellent boats.  Japan seems keen, which 
again marks a major departure from long-standing policies.  And Canberra’s willingness to 
contemplate a major role for Japan in such a key Australian capability shows how confident 
they are that the relationship is only going to get much closer.
This is not all the Gillard Government’s idea.  In fact John Howard can claim credit for initiating the present trend towards closer defence links with Japan.  In his last year in office he flew to Tokyo himself to sign a modest but significant ‘joint declaration’ on 
security cooperation, and at that time he expressed his willingness to go much further and 
sign a full- scale alliance treaty. But since then the strategic uncertainties and risks of the 
Asian century have become more daunting, and the idea of drawing closer to Japan seems 
to have loomed larger and larger in Canberra’s thinking 
about how to manage them.
Of course there is a lot to be said for an alliance with 
Japan. Australia shares a great deal with Japan, including 
a still-vital economic relationship, close alliance with the 
US, a strong convergence in values and outlook, and 
a strong commitment to regional stability.  Australia’s 
relationship with Japan since the war is in many ways 
our closest and most successful in Asia.  And despite 
two decades of economic stagnation, Japan is still Asia’s 
second richest and most powerful country. For many 
decades it will continue to have the strategic weight of a 
great power, if it chooses to use it.
These factors all make Japan a friend worth having, and 
they no doubt explain Canberra’s interest in a stronger 
strategic relationship with Tokyo.  But they do not tell 
the whole story. To get a fuller view we need to see it 
from Japan’s side. Why is Tokyo so interested in a closer relationship with Australia that it is 
willing to overturn decades of deeply-entrenched strategic seclusion? The answer of course 
is China.
China’s rise poses an immense challenge to Japan’s post-war strategic posture.  Tokyo is 
very worried about China. It fears that China will use its growing power to squeeze Japan 
economically, politically and eventually even territorially.  Those fears are understandable.  
Moreover the stronger China becomes, the less sure the Japanese are that America will 
protect them, because the costs and risks of doing so increase as China’s power grows.  So 
Tokyo is anxious to strengthen its alliance with America, and to enhance the US position 
in the wider region. It hopes to help build a regional coalition to support itself and the US 
against China.   
 
Perhaps some in Japan even think of Japan itself one day leading a regional coalition 
against China, if America’s power in Asia eventually fades.  Australia is not the only target 
of this policy: India, Vietnam and others would all be valuable potential members of this 
“Why is Tokyo so 
interested in a closer 
relationship with 
Australia that it is willing 
to overturn decades of 
strategic seclusion? ” 
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coalition. But Australia has proved the most willing to embrace Japan as an ally, and so 
things have moved furthest and fastest with us.  
And this is our problem.  Whatever Canberra might say, from Tokyo’s perspective a closer 
defence relationship with Australia is all about lining us up to support them against China, 
and that is the way Washington and Beijing will see it too, which is why Washington 
likes it and Beijing doesn’t.  The question is whether this is in our interests or not.  That 
depends partly on the broader question of how best to respond to China’s rise.  Tokyo and 
Washington believe that we should resolutely defend the old US-led order, refusing any 
accommodation of China’s ambitions.
 
We in Australia haven’t decided yet whether we agree with that, or whether we incline 
more to seeking some kind of compromise that gives China more space but retains a strong 
US role as well. The Government is still pretending that there is no choice to be made. But, 
our enthusiasm for an alliance with Japan, like our agreement to host US Marines in Darwin, 
clearly put us in the US-Japan camp, supporting what is in effect a policy of containing 
China. So with these policies the Government is making a choice, even as they say there is 
no choice to make.  
This is itself a very good reason to push the pause button on the alliance with Japan 
and think carefully about what it means for our wider regional diplomacy – just as the 
Government seems to have quietly decided to 
slow the growth of US military deployments to 
Australia. Today in Asia every strategic issue bears 
on the fundamental question of the future roles of 
the US and China in the Asian order, on which the 
future of Asia, and Australia, depends. We would 
be very unwise to make choices about our future 
relationship with Japan without considering this 
context very carefully.
But even in its own terms we need to ask some 
searching questions about what a closer defence 
relationship with Japan would really deliver to 
Australia, and what it would cost.  Like others, I find 
the idea of access to Japan’s submarine expertise 
appealing.  However we must balance these 
attractions against the risks of relying for such a 
critical capability on a country which is, for better 
or worse, so deeply engaged in the strategic affairs of our own region, and whose future 
posture and policies are inevitably, at a time of great strategic flux, so unclear.  These risks 
are arguably much lower with more distant European suppliers.
People often use the word loosely, but at its heart a strategic alliance is an agreement between states to go to war in support of one another in some more or less well-defined circumstances. That makes it a very special kind of relationship and one 
not to be entered into lightly or without careful consideration of the implications.  There 
are two questions we need to ask ourselves before talking too freely of an alliance with 
Japan. Under what circumstances would we go to war to support them? Under what 
circumstances would they go to war to support us?
It would be naive to regard these questions as far-fetched or hypothetical, because 
in the end they are what alliances are all about, and the answers to them provide the 
underpinning for much of the day-to-day business of successful alliances like ANZUS and 
NATO.  Nor does it take much effort to imagine the circumstances in which such choices 
might arise.  Since the 2+2 talks in Sydney, Japan and China have been drawn into an 
increasingly acrimonious dispute over the Senkaku/Daiyo Islands which carries a modest 
but very real risk of an armed clash which could quickly escalate into war. If that happened, 
“We need to ask some 
searching questions 
about what a closer 
defence relationship 
would deliver and cost” 
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POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
Australia should push the pause button on the idea of a strategic alliance with Japan.  For 
all the values and outlooks we share, Australia’s strategic interests are quite different from 
Japan’s, and the real risks to Australia far outweigh the potential benefits. 
Japan would seek its allies’ support.  
So the question for us is, if we were Japan’s ally, would we go to war with China to support 
them over the Senkakus? The answer is clear as soon as the question is asked. In anything 
like today’s strategic circumstances, our interests and Japan’s are simply not closely enough 
aligned to make an alliance workable.  
The same is true the other way round.  In a future conflict with Indonesia over West Papua – 
again not entirely improbable – is there any reason to expect that Japan would come to our 
aid at the expense of its relationship with Indonesia – an Indonesia set to be much more 
important in regional power politics than we are?  The answer again is clear.  The fact is that 
for all our close alignment of values and outlook, Australia and Japan have rather different 
strategic interests because our strategic geography is different.  And when alliances are 
tested, it’s interests that count, not values. 
    
This is not to say that one day, in different strategic circumstances, an alliance with Japan 
might not make sense for Australia. If the US withdraws from Asia, and we face a China 
intent on regional hegemony, then alliance with Japan might be one of the options open 
to us. But not the only one, and not necessarily the best. And until that happens we should 
give top priority to building a policy aimed at avoiding that kind of predicament.  An 
alliance with Tokyo has no place in such a policy.
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